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This  paper  argues  that  offshoring  indices  often  measure  something  different  than what  we
think they  are.  Using  data  from  input-output  tables  of  21  European  countries  from  1995
to 2006  we decompose  an offshoring  index,  distinguishing  between  a domestic  (structural
change)  and  an  international  component  (imported  inputs  ratio).  Regarding  offshoring  of
business  services,  a  large  share  of  the  index  variation  is  driven  by  the  domestic  component.
This  is  even  more  pronounced  for overall  service  offshoring.  In the  case  of  material  off-
shoring,  by  contrast,  the international  component  drives  the  main  variation  of  the  indices.
Our results  therefore  show  that,  regarding  (business)  services,  the  typical  calculation  of
offshoring  indices  tends  to over  estimate  the  role  of the  imported  inputs  component,
neglecting  the  role  played  by  structural  changes  in the  economy.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Offshoring is one of the main ingredients of con-
temporary international trade. Its relevance is growing
widely all over the world, and is both orienting the
political agenda of countries as well as shaping the way
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economists think about international trade and its conse-
quences (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996a,b, 1999; Arndt, 1997,
1998a,b; Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008). Parallel to
its relevance, the use of the term is somehow fuzzy and its
quantification is problematic.
From a terminological point of view, offshoring can be
broadly defined as a firm’s allocation of business activities
to another country, either by obtaining goods and services
from an unaffiliated foreign supplier or by investing in a
foreign affiliate or joint venture. Since there is no standard-
ized term yet, various attempts have been made to give the
phenomenon a proper name. This paper uses throughout
the term offshoring.1
1 While the term international outsourcing is also very common, off-
shoring has a much longer history and can be traced back to 1895 (Amiti
and  Wei, 2005a; Horgos, 2009b). Especially in recent years, with numer-
ous  contributions on (business) services and firm level trade, the term
offshoring experienced a renaissance (Winkler, 2010; Crinò, 2009; Crinò,
2012; Amiti and Wei, 2005a,b; Wagner, 2011; Schwörer, 2012; Falzoni
0954-349X/$ – see front matter ©  2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Since offshoring activities are usually difficult to be
observed through firm-level information, direct compara-
tive evidence and evaluation is actually highly improbable.
However, the relevance of the phenomenon and its possi-
ble consequences on the domestic labor and goods markets
have encouraged quantification based on indirect evidence.
Thus, various proxies for the main unobserved variable of
interest, i.e. the offshoring activities of a representative
domestic firm, have been proposed in the literature. Since
offshoring involves a substantial flow of imports of inter-
mediate goods and services (Feenstra, 1998), input–output
tables have been extensively used to compute indices of
offshoring at the sectoral and aggregate level.2
Most of the offshoring indices relate imported inter-
mediates used in the production of an industry to some
kind of normalization, as e.g. the total value of the indus-
try’s production. This incorporates the idea, along the lines
of Feenstra (1998),  that the share of imports of inter-
mediate goods and services over production should be
associated with a higher relevance of offshoring. What
most of the literature using these kind of indices for empir-
ical examinations neglects is that the indices are driven
by two very different components: the share of imported
to domestically produced intermediates, which is the true
international component, and the share of domestically
produced inputs in total production of the industry, which
instead is related to the structural change of the economy
(domestic component).
In this paper, we contribute to this domestic vs. interna-
tional dimension debate on an empirical ground. In order to
separate the two components, we apply a shift-and-share
decomposition of a commonly used offshoring index over
time. In particular, (i) the first component measures the
share of imported business services relative to the use of
domestically produced business services, and can be the
result of a process of offshoring; (ii) the second component
measures the share of domestically produced business ser-
vices used in production in the manufacturing industry,
which is a proxy for the degree of domestic outsourcing,
entailing the process of structural change. For comparison,
we also compute the same decomposition for the case of
overall services and material inputs and we additionally
focus on the service industry as the using sector.
The main result of our contribution is that the increase
in import of business services in manufacturing production,
used as an indicator of the rise in business service off-
shoring, is grossly overestimating the actual increase in the
reliance on foreign produced services in many countries.
The same is true for overall services and to a less extent
to material inputs. Thus, the advice that we obtain from
and Tajoli, 2010; Jona-Lasinio, 2010; OECD, 2006). In the contribution at
hand we  stick to this tradition, even when being aware of that several cited
papers use international outsourcing instead. It is important to note that
when using offshoring we  do not distinguish if the imported intermediate
is  produced in house or bought from an unaffiliated supplier.
2 See Horgos (2009a) for an overview of different indices used as proxies
for  offshoring activities, their quality, and their performance when being
used in estimating labor market effects. The main advantages and limi-
tations of using input–output tables have been highlighted in Chen et al.
(2005), Feenstra et al. (2010).
this paper’s analysis is that we should not really trust off-
shoring indices, when being calculated in a traditional way
(especially when assessing service offshoring).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
discusses the relevant literature, while Section 3 provides
the formal details of index calculation and decomposition
into the domestic and international component. Our empir-
ical analysis along with the results obtained is presented in
Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2. A brief sketch of the relevant literature
Empirical contributions using offshoring indices
present strong evidence of an increasing offshoring activ-
ity for a large set of different economies. Concerning
material offshoring, Campa and Goldberg (1997) calculate
the offshoring activity for the US, Canada, UK, and Japan,
whereas Strauss-Kahn (2003) presents statistics for France.
Geishecker and Görg (2005) or Horgos (2011) examine
offshoring in Germany and Daveri and Jona-Lasinio (2008)
as well as Falzoni and Tajoli (2010) do the same for the
Italian economy. With respect to service offshoring, see
e.g. Winkler (2010) for evidence on Germany or Crinò
(2009), Crinò (2012) for a comparative overview. Liu
et al. (2011) examine location determinants of service
offshoring. The evidence put forward by all this literature
is highly consensual: offshoring is strong and is here to
stay.
At the same time, after a setback during the 1980s, struc-
tural transformation in the manufacturing sector has been
accelerating both in advanced and newly industrialized
economies (Memedovic and Iapadre, 2009).
In the tradition of Chenery et al. (1986) a number of
studies look at the long term and persistent shifts in the
sectoral composition of economic systems. Among oth-
ers, McMillan and Rodrik (2011) emphasize that when,
in developing countries, resources move from less pro-
ductive to more productive activities the economy grows
even if there is no productivity growth within sectors.
Accordingly, they show that a reshuffling of resources
(e.g. labor) from low to high-productivity sectors, and the
consequent change in the composition of value added
shares in the economy, are key drivers of development and
economic growth. In advanced economies, it has been doc-
umented that the decrease in the share of manufacturing
activities has coexisted with an increasing importance of
service activities related to production and with a grow-
ing interdependence between manufacturing and services.
For example, Montresor and Vittucci Marzetti (2011) apply
a subsystem approach originally developed by Momigliano
and Siniscalco (1982) and show that the integration of busi-
ness services into the manufacturing subsystem increased
(in terms of employment) in 7 OECD countries (Canada,
Denmark, Germany, France, Japan, UK and USA) from 19.9%
in the early 80s to 25.9% in the mid-90s. This explains most
(although not all) of the decline in the share of employment
in the manufacturing subsystem over the same period.3 The
3 Similar results have been found for Italy by Momigliano and Siniscalco
(1982) and, more recently, Foresti et al. (2007).
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process of tertiarization that takes place in most industri-
alized economies results mainly from the outsourcing of
service activities that were previously carried out within
manufacturing firms. The reasons why the manufacturing
industry increases the use of external services are manifold.
In modern, specialized economies, the complexity of new
production processes demands for additional coordination
and control (Greenfield, 1996). Especially with regard to
an increase in (vertical) specialization, demand for addi-
tional service links to organize production rises (Jones and
Kierzkowski, 1990; Francois, 1990a,b). Also, product differ-
entiation may  increase the need for additional service tasks.
The supply of modern, innovative services that comple-
ment core competencies of manufacturing firms may  also
increase outsourcing activities in the manufacturing sector
(MacPherson and Vanchan, 2010; Greenhalgh and Gregory,
2001). This process of outsourcing non-core service activi-
ties allows manufacturing firms to focus more on their core
competencies enhancing firms’ productivity (Prahalad and
Hamel, 1990).4
The question that immediately follows from the obser-
vation of the recent coevolution of offshoring and structural
change is if the strong increase of the offshoring of services
that has been reported in the last decades is capturing,
somehow spuriously, the widespread increase in service
inputs demanded by the manufacturing industry more
than an actual increase in the share of imported services
used by the manufacturing industry. We  submit that the
commonly used indices of service offshoring based on
input–output tables, which calculate the share of imported
service intermediates in total production (or input use),
are not separating, as they should do, the international
dimension of offshoring from the domestic dimension of
technological and/or structural change, i.e. for example the
increasing use of services in manufacturing production. A
prevalence of the second component and a minor role of
the first one would indicate that what is captured by the
offshoring indices may  have little to do with offshoring.
In this perspective, our paper connects to an important
debate on whether the decline in value added in the man-
ufacturing industry in industrialized economies is due to
an increase in imported intermediates or to a more inten-
sive use of domestically produced services instead. In this
respect, Sinn (2005) reported that in the last two  decades
the growth of value added in the German manufacturing
sector did progressively fall behind the growth in pro-
duction and, because of this pattern, labeled the German
economy with the nickname of a “Bazaar Economy”. He
argued that firms in the manufacturing sector were act-
ing as a wheel, importing intermediates from abroad and
(after a few minor changes) selling the final commodities
on the domestic and especially the world market. The crit-
ics of this thesis (e.g. Morgan Stanley, 2004a,b; Financial
Times Germany, 2004a,b,c)  opposed that the gap between
output and value added could be explained by simple
4 In the business literature, the increased linkage between manufac-
turing and services and the so resulting rising service intensity is also
denoted as servitization of business (Vandermerwe and Rada, 1988; Pilat
and Wölfl, 2005).
tertiarization, with manufacturing firms sourcing service
tasks from the domestic service sector. The domestic
dimension was  considered to be prevalent with respect
to the international one associated with the “Bazaar Econ-
omy” hypothesis.
3. The offshoring index
In order to illuminate why and how the offshoring
indices are driven by these two  different components, we
discuss the formal details on index calculation in this sec-
tion before presenting our empirical results in Section 4.
The vast majority of contributions measuring offshoring at
the sectoral and aggregate level relies on indicators based
on imports of intermediate goods normalized by the size
of the industry.5 We  follow this tradition and focus our
analysis on the following index:
OffWjt =
∑
w∈Wm
w
jt
pjt
. (1)
The index in Eq. (1) relates the sum of imported inputs
mwjt supplied by industries w ∈ W and used in industry j to
the total value of production, pjt, in industry j at time t. In
our analysis we consider three different sets of inputs W: all
service inputs (W = ser), the subset of business service activ-
ities (W = bs),  and intermediate material inputs (W = mat).
As for the level of disaggregation of the using industry, we
mainly focus on the aggregate of manufacturing industries
(j = man), but we  also perform a comparative check for the
service industry (j = ser). It is worth mentioning that, as dis-
cussed in Horgos (2009a), one could implement various
alternative normalizations. In particular, one frequently
used alternative to total production pjt is total imports or
gross output (Yeats, 2001; Egger and Egger, 2002; Chen
et al., 2005; Geishecker and Görg, 2005). Others have used
the amount of total non-energy intermediate inputs (Jona-
Lasinio, 2010). It can be easily shown that our analysis can
be extended to any other possible normalization, since the
import-related part (the numerator in Eq. (1)) would not
change under alternative normalizations (the denominator
in Eq. (1)). Therefore, any alternative normalization factor,
ajt, will be related to the one used in equation 1 by the
proportionality ratio
pjt
ajt
.6
5 See e.g. Feenstra and Hanson (1996a,b), Hummels et al. (2001), Yeats
(2001),  Egger and Egger (2002), Strauss-Kahn (2003), Hijzen et al. (2004),
Amiti and Wei  (2005a,b),  Geishecker and Görg (2005), Geishecker and
Görg (2008), Hijzen (2007), or Horgos (2011).
6 Authors who  use input–output indices often calculate them at differ-
ent levels of aggregation: a “broad” and a “narrow” version of the index
(see  e.g. Feenstra and Hanson, 1996a,b, 1999; Olsen, 2006; Horgos, 2011).
While the “broad” variant considers all possible imported inputs, the
“narrow” version considers only imported inputs of the same two-digit
industry j. Often, both forms are presented in order to test robustness
of the results. Even when the narrow measure may exhibit some advan-
tages, e.g. to be in line with the WTO  mode 1 definition of offshoring (Olsen,
2006),  it is not possible to calculate this index for the contribution at hand:
a  narrow index can per definition not be calculated when focusing on
(business) service offshoring of manufacturing industries. Note however
that  all three variants calculated in this contribution (business service,
service, and material offshoring) are also not of the “broad” form. They
include not all but specific subsets of inputs. While comparing service
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The index in Eq. (1) can be decomposed into two parts:
OffWjt =
∑
wm
w
jt
pjt
=
[ ∑
wm
w
jt∑
wu
w
jt − mwjt
][∑
wu
w
jt − mwjt
pjt
]
=
[∑
wm
w
jt∑
wd
w
jt
] [∑
wd
w
jt
pjt
]
= MWjt · OWjt , (2)
where uwjt and d
w
jt denote the value of total and domestic
input w (respectively), used by sector j at time t.
Eq. (2) highlights that the offshoring index used in the
literature is in fact composed of two parts: MWjt and O
W
jt .
On the one hand, there is the value of imported inputs
in the set W as a share of the value of domestically pro-
duced inputs (in the same set) used in the production of
sector j at time t, which reflects the extent to which a given
set of inputs is imported rather than sourced domestically.
For example, when W denotes the set of business services
inputs (W = bs),  this will tell us how much business services
used in production of a given good is bought from foreign
suppliers (i.e. imported), rather than being purchased from
domestic companies. We  refer to this ratio as the imported
inputs ratio (MWjt ). On the other hand, the index includes the
share of domestic inputs in the set W used in the total value
of production of good j at time t. This can be thought as a
measure of the degree of structural change or domestic out-
sourcing of inputs W in industry j at time t (OWjt ), that is how
much a firm buys, for example, business services from other
domestic firms rather than producing them within the firm.
While MWjt reflects the contribution of international trans-
actions, OWjt depends on domestic activities only.
7
The contribution of international transactions, as
opposed to the domestic component, to the dynamics of the
offshoring index can be examined applying a shift-share
analysis to Eq. (2).  The change (denoted by !)  in the index
over time is the sum of change of the different components,
when keeping the other component fix (denoted by a “bar”
over the variables).8
!OffWj = !(O · M)Wj = (!O · M)Wj + (O · !M)Wj , (3)
Thus, for any W = bs,  serv, mat, an increase in OffWj from
t to t + r can be driven by either increasing imported inputs
(e.g. business services if W = bs)  as a share of domesti-
cally produced ones, (O ·!M)Wj , which is consistent with
a more intense use of offshoring, or by deepening the share
of the set of inputs bought from domestic suppliers and
offshoring with the specific case of business service offshoring, we  try to
be as conservative as possible.
7 It is worth noting, that our index can be fur-
ther  decomposed into the following expression: OffWjt =
[(
∑
w
mw
jt
)/(
∑
w
dw
jt
)][(
∑
w
dw
jt
)/(
∑
w
uw
jt
][(
∑
w
uw
jt
)/(pjt )]. While differ-
entiating between the use of imported inputs vs. domestic inputs (the
first part of the expression), the use of domestic inputs in percent (the
second part), and the use of inputs in production (the third part), a foreign
component would be part of any of the three parts of the decomposition
(remember: mw
jt
= uw
jt
− dw
jt
). Thus, it would be impossible to clearly
separate the influences of changes happening at the domestic and at the
foreign level.
8 In order to fix one of the components, we  use the mean value of the
first and the last year of observation.
used in production, (M · !O)Wj . We label the first one the
international component and the second one the domestic
component.
To distinguish between these two  components is one
of the core exercise in this analysis. Since most previous
contributions that use input–output based indices show
an increase in offshoring activities, it is important to iden-
tify to what extent such reported pattern is actually driven
by a more intensive use of imported inputs, or by a (more
general) rise in outsourcing of intermediates. In the lat-
ter case, the indices are not revealing any international
activity, however, they may  still capture some specific
sourcing strategy, namely an increase in domestic out-
sourcing, which in the case of (business) services suggests
some tertiarization and structural change of the economy.
4. Offshoring in European economies
In order to shed light on the contribution of the domestic
and international components to the variation of offshoring
indices we use data from the Eurostat’s input–output
tables, combining information from 21 EU countries. As
mentioned by Feenstra et al. (2010),  a major drawback of
most studies calculating offshoring indices on the base of
input–output data is that, due to the lack of import tables
for the various inputs, they need to assume that the share of
import of a given intermediate input is equal to the share of
import of final goods (import proportionality assumption).
For the 21 European countries considered in this analysis,
Eurostat provides a specific import matrix for intermediate
inputs that allows us to overcome the import proportion-
ality assumption and to track domestic and international
inter-sectoral linkages.9
Since different countries provide data for different time
periods (from 1995 to 2006), with yearly data not always
available, we compute !OffWj for each country, using the
first and last year of available data. We  focus on the man-
ufacturing industry as the using industry (j = man) and
compute the decomposition in Eq. (3) for the subset of busi-
ness service inputs (w = NACE 71–74 and W = bs).  The choice
of this level of analysis is due to the increased relevance of
the interlinkages between business services and manufac-
turing for the countries’ economic growth (Guerrieri and
Meliciani, 2005), as discussed in the introduction above. For
comparison, we  extend our analysis also to offshoring of all
service inputs (w = NACE 01–37, except for NACE 10–12 and
W = serv) as well as intermediate material inputs (w = NACE
50–74 and W = mat) by the manufacturing industry. Finally,
as a comparative check, we  replicate our decomposition
focusing on the service industry as the using sector (j = serv).
This allows us to investigate to what extent offshoring of
service tasks has also characterized the service industry.
4.1. Degree and trends in offshoring
In Table 1 we  report the values of the OffWman,t indices
for the 21 EU countries, considering the first period t0 of
9 See Feenstra and Jensen (2012) for a recent attempt to overcome
the limits imposed by the import proportionality assumption to the US
input–output offshoring indices.
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Table 1
Degree of offshoring in the manufacturing industry in 21 European
countries.
Country Offbsman,t0 Off
ser
man,t0
Offmatman,t0
Western Europe
Austria 0.27% 0.87% 21.9%
Belgium 0.53% 2.12% 31.8%
Denmark 0.45% 0.52% 19.6%
Finland 1.53% 2.58% 15.7%
France 0.32% 0.81% 13.7%
Germany 0.21% 0.53% 13.6%
Greece 0.21% 0.47% 13.6%
Ireland 10.26% 12.24% 29.2%
Italy 0.44% 1.34% 14.6%
Netherlands 0.75% 1.69% 25.2%
Norway 0.72% 1.54% 17.6%
Portugal 0.24% 0.51% 22.8%
Spain 0.75% 1.04% 15.5%
Sweden 0.85% 1.88% 18.8%
Median 0.49% 1.19% 18.2%
Inter-quartile range (0.46%) (1.23%) (7.8%)
Eastern Europe
Estonia 0.41% 1.41% 38.4%
Hungary 2.43% 2.55% 34.3%
Lithuania 0.11% 1.50% 17.7%
Poland 0.20% 0.53% 20.4%
Romania 0.72% 1.05% 13.2%
Slovakia 1.40% 2.75% 35.2%
Slovenia 0.27% 1.27% 26.2%
Median 0.41% 1.41% 26.2%
Inter-quartile range (0.82%) (0.86%) (15.7%)
Correlation with GDP −0.164 −0.192 −0.310
available data. The value of Offmatman,t0 is clearly higher than
for Offserman,t0 (as shown e.g. by Amiti and Wei  (2005a,b)
for the US and the UK, as well as by Winkler (2010) for
Germany), which in turn is higher than Offbsman,t0 . However,
remarkable differences emerge across countries. Offmatman,t0
ranges from over 30% in Estonia and Hungary, to less than
15% in France, Germany, Greece, Italy and Romania. Import
of service (Offserman,t0 ) and business service (Off
bs
man,t0
) inputs
account for about 2% and 1%, respectively, but again with
striking differences across countries. The median value of
Offserman,t0 and Off
bs
man,t0
is surprisingly similar in Eastern
and Western European countries, while Offmatman,t0 is sub-
stantially higher in the former group. This is somewhat
consistent with the idea that the share of imported inter-
mediates in total production may  be inflated by the activity
of incoming multinationals, which have been very active in
Eastern European countries over the last decades (we will
get back to this issue in greater detail below). In the three
cases considered, the level of OffWman,t0 is also negatively
correlated with the size of countries (measured by GDP),
suggesting that smaller countries may  be more involved in
offshoring, although this correlation is relatively mild.
In Fig. 1 we plot Offbsman,t , as well as the Mbsman,t and
Obsman,t components, over time, normalizing them to one in
the first year of observation. Results show that the share
of imported business services in total manufacturing pro-
duction (Offbsman,t) rose substantially over the 1995–2006
period in most countries. However, while in countries
such as Germany and Austria, the growth in the share of
domestically purchased business services in total produc-
tion (Obsman,t) is negligible, in other countries, such as France,
Spain, Italy, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia, is
not. As a result, in this latter group of countries the growth
in the ratio of imported over domestically produced busi-
ness services used in manufacturing production (Mbsman,t)
is lower than the growth in imported business services in
total manufacturing production.
This pattern is even more pronounced for service inputs
as a whole. As depicted in Fig. 2, Oserman,t grew at the
same (or an even higher) rate than Mserman,t in Italy, France,
Belgium, Greece, Finland, Netherlands, Portugal, Estonia
and Romania. Conversely, in the case of material interme-
diate inputs, Fig. 3 shows that Omatman,t has been declining
in most countries, while Mmatman,t has increased. To summa-
rize, the evidence suggests that in the case of the aggregate
of service inputs and (to a lesser extent) for the subset of
business services, structural change may  have played a sig-
nificant role in inflating the measures of offshoring used in
the literature. We  will explore this aspect in greater detail
using the shift-share decomposition proposed in equation
3.
4.2. Shift-share analysis
This section analyzes the different contributions of the
imported inputs ratio (MW) and structural change (OW)
to the change of import of inputs W in total produc-
tion (!OffWman) in greater detail. In particular, we  report
the shift-share decomposition proposed in Eq. (3). For
each of the 21 EU countries considered in this analysis,
Tables 2 and 3 report !OffW, the international compo-
nent, (O · !M)Wman, the domestic component, (M · !O)Wman,
as well as the percentage contribution of the international
component to the overall change of the offshoring index,
((O · !M)Wman/!OffWman).
4.2.1. (Business) service inputs
Results in Table 2 reveals that the share of imported
business services in total manufacturing production
(!Offbsman) increased in 17 out of 21 countries. With the
exception of Ireland (where it increased by 13.6% points),
Sweden (1.79% points), Finland (1.41) and the Netherlands
(1.22), !Offbsman rose by less than 1 percentage point in
most countries. However, given the low level of Offbsman
documented in Table 1, the growth rate is often close or
above 100%, as shown in Fig. 1. This growth would lead
to conclude, in line with existing literature, that in the
1995–2005 period, business services have been substan-
tially offshored. The shift-share decomposition, allows to
appreciate that this pattern is the result of the joint contri-
bution of both the international and domestic components.
Only in five countries (Austria, Finland, Germany, Greece
and Ireland) a positive contribution of (O · !M)Wman has not
been accompanied by a significant substantial (M · !O)Wman.
The median for (O · !M)
bs
man
!Offbsman
is below 70% in Western Europe,
suggesting that in half of these countries, the contribution
of the domestic component, (M · !O)bsman, to !Offbsman has
been above 30%. In the case of Eastern European countries,
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Fig. 1. Imported intermediates ratio and outsourcing in Europe: business service inputs. Numbers are normalized to 1 for the first year.
Data  source: Eurostat input–output tables.
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Fig. 2. Imported intermediates ratio and outsourcing in Europe: service inputs. Numbers are normalized to 1 for the first year.
Data  source: Eurostat input–output tables.
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Fig. 3. Imported intermediates ratio and outsourcing in Europe: material inputs. Numbers are normalized to 1 for the first year.
Data  source: Eurostat input–output tables.
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Table 2
Shift-share decomposition of offshoring indices for European countries: business services inputs.
Country (time period) Manufacturing (15–37) (percentage points change)
!Offbsman (O · !M)bsman (M · !O)bsman ((O · !M)bsman)/(!Offbsman)
Western Europe
Austria (1995–2005) 0.60 0.64 −0.04 107%
Belgium (1995–2005) 0.54 0.41 0.14 75%
Denmark (1995–2006) 0.73 0.44 0.28 61%
Finland (1995–2006) 1.41 1.45 −0.05 103%
France (1995–2006) 0.19 0.09 0.10 49%
Germany (1995–2005) 0.31 0.30 0.02 94%
Greece (2000–2005) 0.00 0.01 −0.01 –
Ireland (1997–2005) 13.60 14.60 −1.00 107%
Italy  (1995–2005) 0.40 0.26 0.15 64%
Netherlands (1995–2006) 1.22 0.84 0.38 69%
Norway (2001–2007) −0.18 −0.18 −0.01 −97%
Portugal (1995–2005) −0.02 0.01 −0.03 62%
Spain (1995–2005) 0.56 0.30 0.26 53%
Sweden (1995–2005) 1.79 1.38 0.40 77%
Median 0.555 0.353 0.058 68.89%
Inter-quartile range (0.875) (0.657) (0.256) (33.13%)
Eastern Europe
Hungary (1995–2005) 0.09 −1.28 1.37 –
Lithuania (2000–2005) 0.02 −0.02 0.04 −135%
Poland (2000–2005) 0.08 0.04 0.04 55%
Romania (2000–2006) −0.16 −0.86 0.70 −544%
Slovakia (2000–2005) −0.19 −0.42 0.23 −220%
Slovenia (1996–2005) 0.45 0.27 0.18 59%
Estonia (1997–2005) 0.69 0.22 0.47 32%
Median 0.080 −0.023 0.227 −51.44%
Inter-quartile range (0.339) (0.771) (0.472) (247.69%)
Correlation with GDP −0.082 −0.063 −0.087 0.207
it is striking to notice that, while the international compo-
nent is positive only in 3 out of 7 countries, the domestic
component is always positive and (with the exception of
Slovenia) bigger than the international component.10 This
is consistent with the idea that, while a trend towards the
increase in business service content of manufacturing pro-
duction has been characterizing the advanced economies
in the 70s through the 90s, it has reached Eastern European
countries between the end of the 20th and the beginning
of the 21st century.
To summarize, our decomposition suggests that the
usual indices of business service offshoring would tend
to overestimate the actual increase in the dependence on
imported inputs, due to a concurrent significant change in
the organization of production of business services used in
the manufacturing industries of most European countries.
This is even more evident in the case of overall services.
Table 3 (left panel) shows that !Offserman is positive in all
but five countries (Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Romania and
Slovakia), but only in 8 countries the international compo-
nent contributes to more than 50% of the change in the
offshoring index. The median for ((O · !M)serman)/(!Offserman)
is 61.5% in Western Europe and −83.4% in Eastern
Europe. In some countries, including Belgium, France, Italy,
Netherlands and Hungary, the contribution of (M · !O)bsman
10 It is worth noting that !Offbsman and ((O · !M)bsman/!Offbsman) are only
mildly correlated with GDP and with opposite signs.
was even larger than the contribution of (O · !M)bsman. For
example, in the case of large EU countries such as Italy and
France, the service offshoring index rose by 0.49 and 0.36
percentage points respectively, but the contribution of the
growth of imported services is just about 0.23 and 0.17%
points, respectively. In a few cases, such as Finland, Greece,
Norway, Estonia, Romania and Slovenia, the international
component is even negative, while the domestic compo-
nent is positive. This pattern may  even be consistent with
a substitution of foreign service producers with domes-
tic ones. In other words, in many countries the observed
growth in the share of imported services in total production
depends crucially on the growth of services used in pro-
duction, most likely due to the fact that firms outsourced
services that were previously produced internally.
4.2.2. Material inputs
Rather different considerations emerge when we  con-
sider the subset of material inputs: Offmatman,t has been
growing in all but five countries (Table 3, right panel)
and this change can be attributed entirely to an increas-
ing importance of imported intermediate goods as a share
of those produced domestically, (O · !M)matman. As a matter
of fact, in parallel with this rising trend of imported inter-
mediate materials, in all but two countries (Poland and
Romania) the share of domestic inputs in total manufactur-
ing production, (M · !O)matman, has actually decreased. This
may  reveal either that firms have internalized activities
previously outsourced to domestic suppliers, or that these
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Table 3
Shift-share decomposition of offshoring indices for European countries: service and material intermediate inputs.
Country (time period) Manufacturing (15–37)
Service inputs (percentage points change) Material inputs (percentage points change)
!Offserman (O · !M)serman (M · !O)serman ((O · !M)serman)/!Offserman) !Offmatman (O · !M)matman (M · !O)matman ((O · !M)matman)/!Offmatman)
Western Europe
Austria (1995–2005) 1.09 0.89 0.20 82% 3.94 9.85 −5.91 250%
Belgium  (1995–2005) 0.51 0.04 0.47 8% −0.15 5.65 −5.80 –
Denmark  (1995–2006) 2.34 2.27 0.07 97% 2.63 6.53 −3.90 249%
Finland  (1995–2006) 0.60 −0.22 0.82 −37% 5.30 11.03 −5.74 208%
France  (1995–2006) 0.36 0.17 0.19 48% 3.47 5.99 −2.52 173%
Germany (1995–2005) 0.53 0.50 0.03 95% 4.96 6.39 −1.43 129%
Greece  (2000–2005) 0.08 −0.02 0.10 −27% −0.32 2.74 −3.06 867%
Ireland  (1997–2005) 18.33 28.14 −9.81 154% −9.36 −2.73 −6.63 −29%
Italy  (1995–2005) 0.49 0.23 0.27 46% 1.60 3.90 −2.30 244%
Netherlands (1995–2006) 1.44 0.70 0.74 49% −2.05 1.39 −3.45 68%
Norway  (2001–2007) −0.33 −0.36 0.03 −109% 3.57 5.52 −1.96 155%
Portugal  (1995–2005) 0.07 0.05 0.02 74% 2.59 6.77 −4.18 262%
Spain  (1995–2005) 0.96 0.75 0.22 77% 3.87 6.40 −2.53 166%
Sweden  (1995–2005) 2.17 1.93 0.25 89% 1.46 5.33 −3.87 365%
Median  0.563 0.363 0.192 61.47% 2.606 5.821 −3.658 208.29%
Inter-quartile range (0.960) (0.811) (0.222) (69.71%) (3.535) (2.237) (2.826) (95.13%)
Easterm Europe
Estonia (1997–2005) 0.12 −0.26 0.38 −229% 7.82 24.94 −17.12 319%
Hungary  (1995–2005) 0.62 0.23 0.38 38% 8.00 19.82 −11.82 248%
Lithuania (2000–2005) −0.95 −0.88 −0.06 −94% −3.87 −5.14 1.26 −133%
Poland  (2000–2005) −0.01 0.02 −0.03 175% 3.88 3.60 0.28 93%
Romania  (1995–2006) −0.01 −0.15 0.13 – 2.04 4.68 −2.65 230%
Slovakia  (2000–2005) −0.53 −0.40 −0.13 −76% 3.39 6.92 −3.53 204%
Slovenia  (1996–2005) 0.08 −0.07 0.15 −91% 11.39 29.92 −18.53 263%
Median −0.011  −0.146 0.134 −83.36% 3.876 6.920 −3.525 229.94%
Inter-quartile range (0.369) (0.310) (0.310) (102.22%) (5.196) (18.239) (13.284) (106.86%)
Correlation with GDP −0.067 −0.084 0.112 0.042 −0.175 −0.216 0.203 0.549
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activities have been substituted by foreign ones. The latter
interpretation is particularly consistent with the observa-
tion that an increase in (O · !M)matman is associated with a
decrease in (M · !O)matman.
To summarize, the share of intermediate business
services, services and materials in total manufacturing pro-
duction has been on the rise in a large number of European
countries, but in the case of business services (and even
more for the aggregate of all services) the growth in imports
is the result of both a higher intensity in the use of such
inputs by the manufacturing industry (due to outsourc-
ing and structural change) and a higher propensity to
import them (relative to buying them from domestic pro-
ducers), which is consistent with a process of offshoring
those tasks abroad. Conversely, the evidence suggests that
the manufacturing industry is indeed increasingly buy-
ing intermediate material inputs from foreign suppliers,
consistent with the idea that these activities have been
offshored. However, a closer look at the data casts some
general doubts on this interpretation as well. In fact, the
median values of both !Offmatman and are similar in West-
ern and Eastern European countries. This suggests that
the extent of material offshoring is similar in the two
groups of countries. On the contrary, one would expect
that offshoring has characterized relatively more advanced
economies. Instead, Eastern European countries are not
expected to be offshoring, but, eventually, receiving off-
shored production. This is confirmed by data on individual
countries. In fact, the largest increase in the ratio between
imported and domestically produced intermediate mate-
rials have been registered in countries, such as Estonia,
Hungary and Slovenia, which have been characterized by
a massive flow of inward foreign direct investments (FDIs)
over the last decade. This reflects the fact that the import
of intermediates occurs not only when domestic firms off-
shore production abroad, but also when foreign firms locate
plants in a country and source intermediates from the
headquarters or other plants within the multinational sup-
ply network.
4.3. Service industry
Results obtained when we use NACE 50–74 (services)
as the using industries (j = ser), reported in Table 4 are
qualitatively similar and reinforce our conclusions. Not
surprisingly the values of Offbsser,t0 and Off
ser
ser,t0
are larger
(twice as much) than the same indices for the manufactur-
ing industry, while Offmatser,t0 is negligible, since the material
inputs play obviously a minor role when producing ser-
vices. Similarly, !OffWser is positive for most countries and
it is larger for (business) service inputs. However, in the
case of the service industry, the contribution of the domes-
tic component (M · !O)Wser seems even more relevant than
in the case of manufacturing. As a matter of fact, the median
contribution of the imported (business) services ratio to the
overall change in the offshoring measure is below 50% in
Western European countries, suggesting that in more than
half of these countries, the increase in !Offbsser and !Off
ser
ser
is mainly due to the rising share of services externalized to
domestic producers.
5.  Concluding remarks
Empirical literature has provided rather strong evidence
of increasing offshoring activities, both for service (includ-
ing business service) and material inputs for different
economies in the last decades. Most of these contributions
have used indices based on imports of intermediates from
input-output tables. In this paper we investigate these
indices in greater detail and show that their variance is
driven by different components. Using shift-share analy-
sis we decompose the variation of these indices over time
into two components: (i) one capturing the contribution of
a change in the imported inputs ratio and (ii) one reflect-
ing structural shifts in the economy. While the former may
actually capture offshoring of some tasks, the latter results
from a change in the organization of production within the
national boundaries.
In this empirical analysis we  use data for 21 European
countries over the 1995–2006 period and show that the
share of imported inputs in total production has grown in
most of the countries. In the case of business service inputs,
this increase is significantly affected by the raising share
of (domestically produced) services used in manufacturing
production. This is particularly true for Eastern Euro-
pean countries, where the imported inputs ratio has even
decreased. Also in Western European countries, however,
the contribution of structural shifts in domestic produc-
tion is quite relevant: its median value accounts for above
30% of the total variation of the business offshoring index,
reaching almost 40% in the case of aggregate services. This
finding provides supporting evidence of an ongoing ter-
tiarization process, which may  wrongly be attributed to
offshoring when trusting the commonly applied indices.
Instead, in the case of material offshoring there is evidence
that the imported inputs ratio has increased, while the
degree of domestic shifts in production has decreased. This
is consistent with the fact that foreign suppliers have sub-
stituted domestic ones, what could be interpreted at first
sight that offshoring indices might be reliable in this case.
However, this pattern is most pronounced in countries such
as Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia, where incoming multi-
nationals, rather than the offshoring process of domestic
firms may  be the driving force.
In sum, our analysis raises serious concerns about the
use of data on imports of intermediate inputs to measure
offshoring of business services, services or materials. We
submit that it is crucial to distinguish to what extent higher
imports are related to a more intensive use of such inputs
into manufacturing production, which would result from
a process of (domestic) outsourcing, or whether they actu-
ally derive from a higher propensity to import rather source
those inputs domestically and thus reflecting offshoring
of such tasks. For future econometric analyses this would
suggest that one should additionally control for a struc-
tural change or domestic outsourcing component when
using the discussed indices to estimate the effects of off-
shoring. Furthermore, it is necessary to be aware of the
fact that importing intermediates may  not be related to
a process of offshoring per se. Rather, our evidence sug-
gests that in some countries, an increase in the propensity
to import intermediate material goods may  be due to the
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Table 4
Offshoring indices for European countries: service industries.
Country (time period) Services (50–74)
Business service inputs (percentage points change) Service inputs (percentage points change) Material inputs (percentage points change)
Offbsser !Off
bs
ser ((O ·!M)bsser )/(!Offbsser ) Offserser !Offserser ((O ·!M)serser )/(!Offserser ) Offmatser !Offmatser ((O ·  !M)matser )/(!Offmatser )
Western Europe
Austria (1995–2005) 1.17% 0.42 −77% 3.61% 1.06 −53% 2.36% 0.58 176%
Belgium  (1995–2005) 1.68% 1.12 69% 5.50% 2.26 72% 2.67% 0.76 239%
Denmark (1995–2006) 0.09% 1.50 87% 4.12% 7.72 89% 2.51% 2.52 149%
Finland  (1995–2006) 0.73% 1.30 13% 2.36% 1.57 48% 2.25% 1.32 169%
France  (1995–2006) 0.63% 0.25 43% 1.68% 0.09 −210% 1.71% 0.40 190%
Germany (1995–2005) 0.38% 0.54 87% 1.78% 1.77 69% 1.01% 0.33 196%
Greece  (2000–2005) 0.30% −0.02 −169% 3.47% 0.20 −3% 3.17% 0.15 568%
Ireland  (1997–2005) 5.28% 1.87 −611% 9.43% 6.68 43% 4.87% −1.32 −206%
Italy  (1995–2005) 0.42% 0.30 54% 1.66% 0.27 −31% 1.65% −0.14 7%
Netherlands (1995–2006) 1.97% 0.32 −125% 4.74% 2.79 43% 3.42% −0.75 −45%
Norway  (2001–2007) 1.39% 0.30 118% 6.86% −0.72 −156% 4.23% 1.30 26%
Portugal  (1995–2005) 0.99% −0.17 −290% 2.71% −0.76 −188% 2.63% 0.53 315%
Spain  (1995–2005) 0.51% 0.71 65% 1.36% 1.31 44% 1.26% 0.29 125%
Sweden  (1995–2005) 1.15% 1.16 76% 3.13% 1.64 79% 3.83% 0.30 427%
Median  0.86% 0.48 48.73% 3.30% 1.44 42.96% 2.57% 0.36 172.76%
Inter-quartile range (0.89%) (0.85) (187.77%) (2.66%) (1.92) (111.87%) (1.51%) (0.53) (178.09%)
Eastern  Europe
Estonia (1997–2005) 2.63% −0.51 −159% 6.96% 0.00 – 9.42% −2.66 214%
Hungary  (1995–2005) 2.64% −0.76 −118% 3.81% −0.07 −539% 3.04% 1.90 86%
Lithuania  (2000–2005) 0.69% −0.17 −230% 2.89% −1.38 −110% 3.98% 0.19 535%
Poland  (2000–2005) 0.34% 0.27 85% 2.23% −0.48 −129% 2.49% 0.63 124%
Romania  (2000–2006) 0.58% 0.36 −234% 1.17% 0.50 4% 6.67% 0.08 –
Slovakia  (2000–2005) 2.40% −0.73 −88% 4.05% 0.60 253% 3.01% −0.64 −238%
Slovenia  (1996–2005) 1.15% 0.80 112% 2.13% 1.40 64% 3.64% 1.33 695%
Median  1.15% −0.17 −117.56% 2.89% 0.00 −53.03% 3.64% 0.19 169.12%
Inter-quartile range (1.88%) (0.94) (193.03%) (1.75%) (0.82) (173.01%) (2.30%) (1.27) (359.08%)
Correlation with GDP −0.322 0.071 0.358 −38.28% −0.014 0.023 −0.518 −0.018 −0.114
Please cite this article in press as: Castellani, D., et al., Can we really trust offshoring indices? Struct. Change Econ. Dyn.
(2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.strueco.2012.10.001
ARTICLE IN PRESSG ModelSTRECO-527; No. of Pages 14
D. Castellani et al. / Structural Change and Economic Dynamics xxx (2013) xxx– xxx 13
entry and expansion of foreign multinationals in the coun-
try, which import intermediate goods from their affiliates
or suppliers worldwide. This is relevant if we use the off-
shoring indices to assess the effects on productivity or
employment. For example, while domestic firms shutting
down production activities at home and offshoring them
abroad (substituting it with imported intermediates) may
have negative employment effects, foreign firms increas-
ing production in the country (and thus importing more
intermediates) may  have positive employment effects. In
other words, the same offshoring index may  capture dif-
ferent phenomena under different circumstances, which
makes an interpretation of the effects questionable. As the
title of our contribution suggest, the take-home message
of our analysis is that we should not really trust offshoring
indices based on input–output data.
The sad side of the story is that even if these indices
provide a distorted image of offshoring, we still have to live
with them. The most natural alternative, which is moving
from indirect evidence of offshoring to a direct one is still
far from being systematically available to researchers. Fea-
sible alternatives relying on firm-level data are scarce and
must be handled with care. As shown in Wagner (2011),
also the research potential of hitherto existing firm-level
data is limited: in order to achieve information both on
offshoring activities and on the characteristics of firms and
their performance, it is still necessary to combine different
data sources, some of them expressly made for the pur-
pose of the research.11 More generally, the fundamental
question in the use of survey data, exacerbated by the com-
mon  practice of merging different datasets coming from
different surveys with different survey designs, is that often
the population of reference is, or becomes, unclear and the
representativeness of the results doubtful. Moreover, since
firm-level data are often available at the national level, the
question of the external validity of the results at the inter-
national level must be always taken into consideration.
Other sources of firm-level information on offshoring, such
as the fact-sheet data from the European Restructuring
Monitor12 may  yield supplemental insights but, as clearly
mentioned on the ERM website, these data, which are based
on company announcements, are indicative rather than
comprehensive.
The happy side of the story is that, in spite of the ques-
tionable interpretation of offshoring indices, input–output
data still represent a fundamental source of information on
the extent of national and international linkages in produc-
tion of manufacturing and service goods. We  might not call
it offshoring (always), but it still shows something that can-
not be ignored. Paying attention to the distinction between
international offshoring and structural change in domestic
activities may  still provide interesting insights. Moreover,
the possibilities offered by multivariate analysis to con-
trol for possible confounders associated to offshoring (e.g.
11 Specifically, Wagner (2011) draws on the “relocation of economic
activities” special-purpose survey from the German Federal Statistical
Office.
12 Consult the Eurofound webpage http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/
emcc/erm/index.htm for further information.
the relevance of MNEs activities) can help interpreting the
effect associated to input–output offshoring indices.
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